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THE AMBIGUITY OF REDESIGNATION: 
WHAT IS ‘APPLICABLE’ UNDER THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT? 
Andrew Miller 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1972, Governor Ronald Reagan submitted the first State Im-
plementation Plan (SIP) to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under 
the new Clean Air Act (CAA).1 A SIP is a plan implemented by states using 
EPA approved strategies and regulations meant to achieve National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).2 The SIP requirement was designed by Con-
gress to be the central component of new federal-state partnership established 
under the CAA.3 Once the SIP has satisfied the requirements of the EPA, it is 
approved and becomes enforceable under state and federal law.4 
Over the 44 years since the first SIP was submitted to the EPA, states have 
struggled to meet CAA requirements.5 When a state fails to meet the ambient 
air quality standard set by the EPA for a particular pollutant, the state is desig-
nated to be in nonattainment.6 If a state has been designated in nonattainment 
for a particular pollutant, and subsequently meets the air quality standards and 
other statutory requirements, it can petition the EPA for a redesignation from 
nonattainment to attainment.7 This Note addresses a split between two circuit 
                                                 
 1 Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean Air Act: History, Perspective, and Direc-
tion for the Future, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 1, 2 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. 
Zacaroli, eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
 2 ROY S. BELDEN, CLEAN AIR ACT 25 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli, eds., 2d ed. 
2011). 
 3 Christopher D. Ahlers, Origins of the Clean Air Act: A New Interpretation, 45 ENVTL. 
L. 75, 119 (2015). 
 4 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 26. 
 5 Barr, supra note 1, at 3. 
 6 “Non-attainment” will be further explained in Section II. Alec C. Zacaroli, Meeting 
Ambient Air Standards: Development of the State Implementation Plans, in THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT HANDBOOK 1, 44 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 3d ed. 2011). 
 7 Id. at 45. 
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courts pertaining to whether or not the statute outlining the requirements for 
redesignation is ambiguous. The answer will propose how best to determine 
what is mandatory and what is within the EPA’s discretion when approving a 
redesignation plan. 
On July 14, 2015, the Sixth Circuit determined that the provision for redes-
ignation was not ambiguous enough to trigger a Chevron8 level of deference in 
deciding what components of a SIP are applicable in determining the redesig-
nation of an area from nonattainment to attainment.9 The Sixth Circuit explicit-
ly stated that that their decision departs from the approach taken by the Sev-
enth Circuit.10 The Seventh Circuit, eleven years earlier, found that “applica-
ble” was without definition in the statute and therefore deference was given to 
the EPA in their interpretation of the statute.11 
This Note will analyze the CAA as interpreted by the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits, and determine which court correctly determined the ability of the 
EPA to use its discretion in redesignating an area in nonattainment. Part II will 
provide background into the CAA, particularly the legislative history of the 
Act, the requirements of the Act, and definition of key terms used throughout 
the Act. Part III will survey the two conflicting circuit opinions, the Seventh 
Circuit and Sixth Circuit, respectively. Part IV will argue that the Sixth Circuit 
incorrectly applied precedent and wrongly found the redesignation provisions 
unambiguous. It will further argue why the Seventh Circuit was correct in find-
ing the redesignation portions of the CAA are ambiguous and the EPA’s inter-
pretation of these provisions permissible, thus giving them deference under 
Chevron. 
II. CLEAN AIR ACT OVERVIEW 
a. History of the Air Pollution Legislation 
The evolution of Congress’ legislation intending to control air pollution be-
gan with the enactment of Air Pollution Control Act of 1955.12 The driving 
forces behind this legislation were local and international air pollution trage-
                                                 
 8 Chevron will be discussed further in Section IV. For now, it shall suffice to say that 
Chevron grants discretion to agencies in interpreting statutes when 1) intent of Congress is 
unclear and 2) the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 9 Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 669 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Sierra Club v. EPA, 375 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 12 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 5. 
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dies.13 The first of these tragedies occurred in Donora, Pennsylvania in 1948, as 
the result of air pollution from several U.S. Steel mills.14 By the time the mills 
were shut down and the fog lifted, 22 residents had died and nearly half of the 
13,000 remaining residents were ill.15 The second was in 1952, when the Unit-
ed Kingdom experienced 5 days of intense smoke-like pollution which caused 
the death of over 4,000 people, left many with respiratory problems, disrupted 
the lives of millions more, and killed livestock.16  These events alerted the pub-
lic to the danger of air pollution and prompted many state and federal laws.17 
The 1955 Act provided funding for federal research programs and author-
ized the U.S. Surgeon General to provide technical and research assistance to 
the States.18 The Clean Air Act of 1963 followed as the first federal legislation 
designed to control air pollution.19 This Act created additional research pro-
grams and directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), 
to take actions to decrease air pollution.20 
The federal government’s first regulation of sources of air pollution came 
with the 1967 Air Quality Act.21  For the first time, HEW was tasked with set-
ting national air quality parameters, which the states would use to then set am-
bient air quality standards. 22 For the first time, states were now required to 
submit their implementation plans to the federal government as a means of 
enforcement.23 
Two key events in 1970 preceded the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act: the 
first Earth Day was celebrated and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) was created.24 The goal of the newly created Agency was to bolster the 
enforcement of federal environmental laws.25 With the enactment of the 1970 
                                                 
 13 Ahlers, supra note 3, at 78. 
 14 Don Hopey & David Templeton, In 1948, smog left deadly legacy in Donora, PITTS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 12, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/news/health/2010/12/12/In-1948-smog-left-deadly-legacy-in-
Donora/stories/201012120248. 
 15 Id. 
 16 The Great Smog of 1952, METOFFFICE.GOV.UK, 
http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/learning/learn-about-the-weather/weather-phenomena/case-
studies/great-smog (last updated Apr. 20, 2015). 
 17 EPA, THE PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT 2 (2007), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/peg.pdf. 
 18 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 5. 
 19 Evolution of the Clean Air Act, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-
overview/evolution-clean-air-act [hereinafter Evolution] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
 20 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 5. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 6. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Ahlers, supra note 3, at 117. 
 25 Id. 
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Act, Congress granted the EPA the authority to regulate air pollution.26 
This new Act established a comprehensive federal and state partnership to 
limit air pollution from stationary and mobile sources.27 The newly formed 
EPA would now be responsible for establishing air quality levels acceptable 
for public health and welfare, called National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS). 28  In order to achieve these new air quality standards, the EPA 
would guide each state in developing a plan to reduce air pollution, called a 
State Implementation Plan.29 
A major revision of the Clear Air Act occurred in 1977.30 The primary aim 
of these amendments was to prevent increased pollution in states that were 
meeting the air quality standards through the Prevention of Significant Deterio-
ration (PSD), and to place further restrictions on states that had not yet reached 
the air quality standard for air pollution.31 The CAA was further amended in 
1990 to expand the responsibility and authority of the federal government.32 
These 1990 amendments created new requirements for areas not meeting the 
ambient air quality standards for certain pollutants; more stringently regulated 
mobile emissions; created new programs to target acid rain; created a permit 
system for major stationary sources; and upgraded criminal violations of the 
statute from misdemeanors to felonies.33 
b. Purpose of the Clear Air Act   
On April 22, 1970, the first Earth Day, twenty million people across Ameri-
ca held public demonstrations demanding federal action in confronting envi-
ronmental issues. 34  In responding to these demands, Congress found that a 
large number of people were moving to expanding metropolitan areas.35 This 
urbanization, they found, was harmful to the health and welfare of individuals, 
as well as to agricultural crops and animals.36 Thus, the CAA sought to protect 
the country’s air quality for the public health and welfare of the people.37 Con-
                                                 
 26 Id. at 118. 
 27 Evolution, supra note 19. 
 28 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 6. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Evolution, supra note 19. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 8-9. 
 34 EPA History: Earth Day, EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/epa-history-earth-
day (last visited Aug. 23, 2016). 
 35 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(1) (2012). 
 36 Id. at § 7401(a)(2). 
 37 Id. at § 7401(b)(1). 
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gress felt it could do this by encouraging a “national research and development 
program to achieve the prevention and control of air pollution.”38 In order to do 
this, Congress sought “to provide technical and financial assistance” to the 
states in developing and executing “air pollution prevention and control pro-
grams.”39 Its primary goal was to encourage and promote reasonable action 
among federal, state, and local governments in preventing air pollution.40 
These are the purposes given by Congress in the Act itself. However, many 
involved with the passage of the 1970 CAA would argue that its true purpose 
was to strengthen the enforceability of prior pollution laws.41 The failure of the 
states in implementing and enforcing air pollution laws under the prior federal 
legislation led to a need to elevate enforcement to a national level.42 
c. National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
There are six listed43 criteria44 pollutants for which the EPA sets National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards: “sulfur dioxide (SO2), particulate matter (PM), 
nitrogen oxide (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O3) and lead (Pb).”45 For 
each of these pollutants, the EPA sets both primary NAAQS, the levels that 
“are requisite to protect the public health”46 and secondary NAAQS, the level 
that “is requisite to protect the public welfare.”47 Once the EPA promulgates 
the NAAQS, it is the responsibility of the states to achieve these standards for 
each pollutant within their Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs).48 An AQCR 
                                                 
 38 Id. at § 7401(b)(2). 
 39 Id. at § 7401(b)(3). 
 40 Id. at § 7401(c). 
 41 Paul G. Rogers, The Clean Air Act of 1970, 16 EPA J. 21, 22 (1990). 
 42 Id. (stating one of the reasons the 1967 Air Quality Act failed and thus spurred Con-
gress to enact a tough national air quality program in 1970 was the almost complete lack of 
enforcement of the earlier statute). 
 43 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 16 (“Courts have recognized that EPA has a mandatory duty 
to list a substance if the agency determines that (1) the substance is an air pollutant, (2) the 
pollutant is emitted by numerous or diverse sources, and (3) the pollutant’s presence in the 
atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”). 
 44 Richard E. Ayres & Jessica L. Olson, Setting National Ambient Air Quality Stand-
ards, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 1, at 13, 15 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli 
eds., 2011) (stating that within 12 months of listing a substance as an air pollutant, the EPA 
must publish air quality “criteria” that reflects the latest scientific information helpful in 
determining the kind and extent of the effect the pollutant will have on public health and 
welfare by its presence in the air). 
 45 Id. at 13; See generally National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Stand-
ards, 40 C.F.R. § 50.4-50.18 (2006) (referencing the pollutants that are being regulated and 
how). 
 46 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012). 
 47 Id. at § 7409(b)(2). 
 48 Zacaroli, supra note 6, at 43. 
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is established in three ways: (1) under the Air Quality Act of 1967; (2) the 
EPA, working with the state and local governments, may create any interstate 
or major intrastate area as an AQCR; and (3) any portion of the state not al-
ready under an AQCR can be established as an AQCR.49 
d. State Implementation Plan 
The SIP is the mechanism by which state and federal government enforce 
the NAAQS requirements.50 The SIP must “include enforceable emissions limi-
tations and other control measures (including economic incentives such as fees, 
marketable permits, and auctions of emissions rights)” and their timeline for 
compliance.51 The SIP must “provide for establishment . . . appropriate devices, 
methods, systems and procedures necessary to monitor, compile, and analyze” 
air quality data.52 Also, the SIP regulates any modifications to and construction 
of stationary sources within its jurisdiction.53 Further, the SIP must also contain 
adequate provisions to prevent significant contribution to nonattainment for the 
NAAQS and prevent significant deterioration of the air quality or protect visi-
bility.54 Lastly, the SIP must assure the EPA that it will have adequate person-
nel, laws, and funding to enforce the requirements in its implementation plan.55 
e. Attainment and Nonattainment 
Each AQCR will be designated either in attainment, nonattainment, or un-
classifiable for each pollutant.56 An AQCR is in attainment for a particular pol-
lutant when it meets the primary or secondary NAAQS for that pollutant.57 
Nonattainment is given for AQCR if a pollutant exceeds the primary or sec-
ondary NAAQS.58 An “area that cannot be classified on the basis of available 
information” is designated unclassifiable.59 
An area designated as in attainment or unclassifiable must take measures to 
“prevent significant deterioration of air quality.”60 The Prevention of Signifi-
                                                 
 49 Id. 
 50 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 25-26. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 52 Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(B)(i). 
 53 Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(C). 
 54 Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(D)(i)-(ii). 
 55 Id. at § 7410 (a)(2)(E). 
 56 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2012). 
 57 Id. at § 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
 58 Id. at § 7407(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 59 Id. at § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii). 
 60 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (2012). 
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cant Deterioration (PSD) programs are designed to ensure that areas that are 
meeting the NAAQS (in attainment) do not further degrade their air quality.61 
Areas not achieving the NAAQS, designated as in nonattainment, are required 
to implement control measures within their SIPs to achieve the NAAQS.62 
f. Redesignation 
An AQCR may be redesignated from nonattainment to attainment either by 
the EPA Administrator due to “available information indicat[ing]” redesigna-
tion is warranted, or by a petition from the state governor seeking redesigna-
tion.63 Any redesignation from nonattainment to attainment must satisfy the 
following criteria: (1) the area has achieved the NAAQS,64 (2) the EPA has 
fully approved the implementation plan,65 (3) the EPA has determined that the 
“the improvement in air quality is due to permanent and enforceable reductions 
in emissions” as a result of the SIP and federal air control regulation,66 and (4) 
the EPA has approved the maintenance plan for the AQCR.67 
g. Reasonably Available Control Technology 
If an area is in nonattainment of the NAAQS, it is required to provide for the 
“implementation of all reasonably available control measures as expeditiously 
as practicable (including such reductions in emissions from existing sources in 
the area as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of reasonably 
available control technology).”68 The CAA does not give a definition for rea-
sonably available control technology (RACT).69 However, the EPA has defined 
it as the “lowest emission limitation” that an individual source can accomplish 
through control technology that is “reasonably available considering techno-
logical and economic feasibility.”70 To assist the states in determining appro-
priate RACT requirements, the EPA issues Control Technique Guidelines 
(CTGs). While not binding on the States, CTG serves as a good indicator of 
what the EPA considers a fulfillment of the RACT requirement.71 
                                                 
 61 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 53. 
 62 Zacaroli, supra note 6, at 49. 
 63 Id. at 45. 
 64 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E)(i). 
 65 Id. at § 7407(d)(3)(E)(ii). 
 66 Id. at § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iii). 
 67 Id. at § 7407(d)(3)(E)(iv). 
 68 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (2012). 
 69 Zacaroli, supra note 6, at 49. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 50. 
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III. BACKGROUND ON CIRCUIT SPLITS 
a. Seventh Circuit’s Sierra Club v. EPA 
After the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, which lowered the level of 
acceptable ozone pollution in the NAAQS requirements, the St. Louis Metro-
politan area was determined to be in moderate72 nonattainment.73 By not com-
plying with the November 15, 1996, deadline for attainment, the AQCR was to 
be automatically reclassified as a serious nonattainment area.74 Then, the EPA 
decided that the AQCR had made enough progress before the deadline that 
they would suspend the “serious” nonattainment status.75 The Sierra Club chal-
lenged this decision, and the court agreed, that the St. Louis Metropolitan area 
should be classified as a serious nonattainment area.76 The new deadline for the 
SIP containing the new requirements under the area’s new classification as 
“serious” nonattainment was January 30, 2004.77 In 2002, before this deadline, 
St. Louis Metropolitan area met the ozone NAAQS.78 
Having met the standards, the states making up the St. Louis Metropolitan 
area sought a redesignation of their AQCR as being in attainment.79 When re-
designating an AQCR from nonattainment to attainment, the EPA must do the 
following: 
(i) the Administrator determines that the area has attained the national ambient air 
quality standard; 
(ii) the Administrator has fully approved the applicable implementation plan for 
the area under section 7410(k) of this title; 
(iii) the Administrator determines that the improvement in air quality is due to 
permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions resulting from implementation 
of the applicable implementation plan and applicable Federal air pollutant control 
regulations and other permanent and enforceable reductions; 
(iv) the Administrator has fully approved a maintenance plan for the area as 
meeting the requirements of section 7505a of this title; and 
(v) the State containing such area has met all requirements applicable to the area 
                                                 
 72 In 1990, Congress amended the requirements for AQCRs that are in nonattainment 
for Ozone pollution. It created five classifications for areas of nonattainment: marginal, 
moderate, serious, severe and extreme. Each classification had its own requirements as well 
as the requirements of the lower classes. BELDEN, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
 73 Sierra Club, 311 F.3d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id at 855. 
 76 Id. at 862. 
 77 Brief for Respondent at 15, Sierra Club v. EPA, 375 F.3d 537 (2004) (Nos. 03-2839 
and 03-3329). 
 78 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 538. 
 79 Id. 
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under section 7410 of this title and part D of this subchapter.80 
The EPA determined the St. Louis Metropolitan area had met all five of 
these requirements and redesignated the area as in attainment. 81 The Sierra 
Club challenged the EPA’s decision under requirements (ii) and (iv), alleging 
that the St. Louis area did not have proper “applicable implementation plan” 
and “maintenance plan.”82 The court’s decision as to requirement (iv) will not 
be discussed further.83 
The dispute regarding requirement (ii) was over what kind of implementa-
tion plan is “applicable.”84 According to the Sierra Club, the “applicable” plan 
should be the pre-attainment plan.85 The Sierra Club contended that Congress 
intended for the SIP of a nonattainment area to have met all of the SIP re-
quirements for a serious nonattainment area, before redesignation should be 
allowed.86 In its view, Congress wanted to prevent states from using redesigna-
tion as a way to avoid control measures (RACT/RACM) placed on nonattain-
ment areas.87 Furthermore, the Sierra Club did not find the word “applicable” 
to be ambiguous due to its use in other parts of the Clean Air Act.88 
The EPA alleged that the requirement (ii) is ambiguous, and thus, under the 
Supreme Court’s Chevron decision, meant the EPA has deference in interpret-
ing which plan is “applicable.”89 The EPA decided that the SIP St. Louis was 
implementing at the time the redesignation request was submitted was an ap-
propriate “applicable implementation plan.”90 The EPA argued it would be un-
reasonable to require states to comply with stricter standards than the require-
ments it used to come within compliance of the NAAQS.91 Furthermore, they 
                                                 
 80 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E) (2012). 
 81 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 539 (citing Determination of Attainment of Ozone Standard, 
St. Louis Area; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, and Redesignation of 
Areas for Air Quality Planning Purposes, State of Missouri, 68 Fed. Reg. 25418 (May 12, 
2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 81) and Approval and Promulgation of Implementa-
tion Plans, and Designation of Areas for Air Quality Purposes, State of Illinois, 68 Fed. Reg. 
25442 (May 12, 2003) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52 and 81)). 
 82 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 539. 
 83 While §7407(d)(3)(E)(iv) was an area of contention in the Seventh Circuit case, it is 
not a portion of the statute under review in the Sixth Circuit case. Since there is not a disa-
greement among the two circuits pertaining to (iv), the Seventh Circuit’s decision as to (iv) 
will be omitted from this discussion. 
 84 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 540. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Brief for Petitioner at 10, Sierra Club v. EPA, 375 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-
2839 and 03-3329). 
 87 Id. at 12. 
 88 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 541. 
 89 Brief for Respondent at 23-24, Sierra Club v. EPA, 375 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(Nos. 03-2839 and 03-3329). 
 90 Id. at 26-27. 
 91 Id. at 28. 
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claimed that delaying redesignation while waiting for a future SIP (the SIP that 
would require approval under serious nonattainment), would “unduly impede 
or prolong” the process without any added benefit.92 
The Seventh Circuit boils the question down to whether St. Louis, having 
their status automatically raised to serious nonattainment, must use RACM 
associated with serious nonattainment.93 The court summarizes the EPA’s ar-
gument finding that “the ‘applicable’ plan requires an area to continue doing 
whatever worked, and nothing more.”94 In contrast, they summarized the Sierra 
Club’s interpretation of an “applicable” plan to mean “‘whatever should have 
been in the plan at the time of attainment’ rather than ‘whatever actually was in 
the plan and already implemented or due at the time of attainment.’”95 
The court found both interpretations as “conceivable understandings of the 
law.” 96  Given this finding, the court held Chevron97  gives deference to the 
EPA’s interpretation of the statute.98 The court noted that if Congress had a 
rigid definition of “applicable” they could have easily drafted it that way.99 
They rejected the Sierra Club’s claim that the court should look to other parts 
of the CAA for the use of “applicable” because the word “takes color from 
context; it lacks a single, enduring meaning.”100 Lastly, the court found the Si-
erra Club’s interpretation, which would have required businesses to undertake 
costly measures despite having achieved NAAQS through approved means, 
resulted in no payoff for compliance.101 
b. Sixth Circuit’s Sierra Club v. EPA 
In 2005, the EPA designated the Cincinnati-Hamilton area as in nonattain-
ment for fine particular matter (PM2.5).102 In 2011, the EPA approved the peti-
                                                 
 92 Id. at 29. 
 93 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 540. 
 94 Id. at 540-41. 
 95 Id. at 541. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question before the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”). 
 98 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 541. 
 99 Id. (giving an example of clear phraseology, “the Administrator has determined that 
the area will continue to abide by the implementation plan that was, or should have been, in 
place?”). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Brief for Respondent at 20, Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 
12-3169, 12-3182, 12-3420); see also 40 C.F.R. § 81.336 (2016) (this regulation contains 
designated areas for the State of Ohio). 
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tion of Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky for redesignation of the Cincinnati-
Hamilton area from nonattainment to attainment for PM2.5. 103  Cincinnati-
Hamilton met the NAAQS in large part to implementation of a regional cap-
and-trade program that reduced interstate pollution.104 The EPA granted their 
request even though the states’ agencies had not implemented RACT control 
measures that were applicable to nonattainment areas. 105  The Sierra Club 
brought suit against the EPA, alleging that the EPA acted illegally in approving 
the SIPs without RACT measures and in redesignating the area as in attain-
ment. 106 
The Sierra Club challenged the EPA’s decision based on §§ 
7407(d)(3)(E)(ii)-(iii) for redesignation,107 mentioned in the previous case.108 
The Sierra Club argued that the EPA failed to satisfy §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) by 
approving the SIPs without RACT/RACM provisions.109 They contended, that 
under § 7502(c)(1), all SIPs for nonattainment areas “shall provide for the im-
plementation of all reasonably available control measures [RACM] as expedi-
tiously as practicable (including such reductions in emissions from existing 
sources in the area as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum of 
reasonably available control technology [RACT]) . . .”. 110 
The EPA argued the provisions to mandate the RACM/RACT measures on-
ly apply if they are needed to attain the NAAQS for PM2.5.111 They stated that 
“applicable implementation plan” in § 7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) does not unambigu-
ously refer to the pre-attainment plan.112 Furthermore, the “fully approve[d]” 
component of § 7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) applies only to the parts of the SIP that were 
necessary for reaching the NAAQS levels and not all statutory provisions re-
quired within nonattainment areas.113 
The court found Congress’s language unambiguously mandates the imple-
mentation of RACT/RACM in SIPs.114 They cite “shall provide” language in § 
7502(c)(1), as evidence that Congress unambiguously requires 
RACT/RACM.115 If the state has not implemented RACT/RACM, the EPA 
                                                 
 103 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 660-61. 
 104 Id. at 659. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. at 661. 
 108 Id. at 665. As with the Seventh Circuit case, the court’s decision as to requirement 
(iii) will not be discussed further as there is no dispute between the two circuits pertaining to 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(iii). 
 109 Id. at 661. 
 110 Id. at 668. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 669. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 670. 
 115 Id. at 669. 
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cannot approve its SIP and redesignation is not permissible.116 Furthermore, the 
court “respectfully disagree[d] with the Seventh Circuit that ‘applicable im-
plementation plan’ is sufficiently vague to trigger Chevron deference.”117 In 
doing so, they rejected the EPA’s interpretation of requiring RACT only if 
necessary for attainment.118 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The crux of the disagreement between the Seventh and Sixth Circuit comes 
down to whether or not the word “applicable” as used in §7407(d)(3)(E) is am-
biguous enough to trigger Chevron deference.119 The cornerstone of the Sixth 
Circuit’s argument is a reliance on Wall v. EPA.120 A thorough examination of 
its use of Wall is helpful in understanding why the Sixth Circuit was wrong in 
concluding that §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) unambiguously requires RACT in a SIP of 
an area that has achieved NAAQS to be “applicable.”121 The Seventh Circuit 
was correct in determining that “applicable” as found in §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) was 
sufficiently ambiguous enough to trigger Chevron level of analysis. 
a. Sixth Circuit’s Rationale 
As stated above, the Sixth Circuit, in reaching their decision, relied upon 
their previous decision in Wall v. EPA. In Wall, a case dealing with the redes-
ignation of Cincinnati from nonattainment to attainment for ozone pollution,122 
the Sixth Circuit found that “applicable” under §7407(d)(3)(E)(v) was ambigu-
ous.123 §7407(d)(3)(E)(v) states: “the State containing such area has met all 
requirements applicable to the area under Section 7410 of this title and part D 
of this subchapter.”124 Part D that is referred to in this provision is broken up 
into Subparts. The Subpart in question in Wall was Subpart 2, which pertains 
                                                 
 116 Id. at 670. 
 117 Id. at 669. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Sierra Club, 375 F.3d at 541; Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
 120 Wall v. EPA, 265 F.3d 426, 442 (6th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the EPA had discre-
tion as to portions of (v) except in the use of RACT in a SIP for moderate ozone pollution); 
See Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669 (The plaintiff in this case relied on the opinion first out-
lined in Wall v. EPA). 
 121 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
 122 Wall, 265 F.3d at 432. 
 123 Id. at 439 (“Although ‘applicable’ could be interpreted as limiting only the geograph-
ical area to which the statutory requirements must apply, it can also be interpreted as limit-
ing the number of actual requirements within CAA § 110 and part D that apply to a given 
area.”). 
 124 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)(E)(v). 
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to “Additional Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment Areas.”125 The court in 
Wall decided to defer to the EPA on the portions of part D that Congress did 
not give clear requirements and make mandatory portions with clear congres-
sional intent.126 
The court found the portions of part D pertaining to a transportation-
conformity requirement127 were sufficiently ambiguous in regards to their ap-
plicability for redesignation requests.128 There was, however, a portion of part 
D that Congress did unambiguously require of the SIP: the implementation of 
RACT for ozone pollution.129 Subpart 1 of part D pertains to nonattainment 
areas in general and Subpart 2 pertains to “Additional Provisions for Ozone 
Nonattainment Areas.”130 Subpart 2 provides that “[t]he State shall submit a 
revision to the applicable implementation plan to include provisions to require 
the implementation of reasonably available control technology.” 131  To the 
court, this portion of part D is a clear indicator that Congress wanted RACT to 
be a required portion of the applicable SIP for ozone pollution.132 
The pollutant at issue in the Sixth Circuit’s Sierra Club was particulate mat-
ter (PM2.5).133 PM2.5 is not subject to Subpart 2 of part D, but falls under the 
requirements listed in Subpart 1 of part D.134 However, the Sixth Circuit found 
that the clear congressional intent that Wall found in Subpart 2, can also be 
found in Subpart 1 as it pertains to PM2.5.135 Their rationale was the “statutory 
language at issue in that case is functionally identical to” the language of Sub-
part 2.136 Therefore, the Court comes to the conclusion that since Wall unam-
biguously requires RACT in a SIP seeking redesignation under Subpart 2 for 
ozone pollution, RACT is unambiguously required for particulate matter redes-
ignation as well.137 
The redesignation statute in question in Wall was §7407(d)(3)(E)(v),138 while 
                                                 
 125 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. D, Subpt. 2. 
 126 Wall, 265 F.3d at 440. 
 127 These conformity requirements prohibit a federal agency from providing financial 
assistance to activities that do not conform to the applicable SIP requirements. For example, 
in ozone non-attainment area, the state is required to implement vehicle inspection pro-
grams. BELDEN, supra note 2, at 157-58. 
 128 Wall, 265 F.3d at 440. 
 129 Id. 
 130 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. D, Subpt. 1 and 2. 
 131 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(b)(2) (2012). 
 132 Wall, 265 F.3d 426 at 440. 
 133 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 660. 
 134 42 U.S.C. § 7502. 
 135 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Wall, 265 F.3d at 438. See 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E)(v) (the State containing such 
area has met all requirements applicable to the area under section 7410 of this title and part 
D of this subchapter). 
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the redesignation statute in Sierra Club was §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii).139 However, the 
court reads them as essentially synonymous in saying: 
Again, we held in [Wall] that the Act unambiguously requires RACT in the area’s 
SIP as a prerequisite to redesignation despite use of the phrase “applicable imple-
mentation plan” in the ozone RACT provision. Clearly, we did not read this 
phrase as an implicit delegation to the EPA to require ozone RACT only if neces-
sary to attainment, and we do not now read that phrase in §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) as a 
similar delegation with respect to the general RACM/RACT provisions for all 
types of emission.140 
In rejecting any deference to the EPA under §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii), the court 
cites the teaching under Wall as to §7407(d)(3)(E)(v).141 They claim that the 
“type of language”142 under review in Sierra Club is the same as in Wall and 
that “type of language” unambiguously requires RACM/RACT to be imple-
mented prior to redesignation.143 This summarizes the extent of the rationale 
used by the Sixth Circuit in determining that there is an unambiguous require-
ment for RACT implementation within SIP before redesignation can be ap-
proved. 
b. Why the Sixth Circuit Misapplied Wall 
In a dissent, Justice Brandeis once stated “[s]tare decisis is usually the wise 
policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right.”144 While the Sixth Circuit’s reliance 
on the past statutory interpretation in Wall is admirable for consistency rea-
sons, the court rigidly applies the statutory interpretation in Wall to the statutes 
at issue in Sierra Club. Statutory interpretation is not to be a mechanical exer-
cise in which a court applies a set of inflexible rules.145 
That is exactly what the Sixth Circuit has done in Sierra Club. By relying on 
past statutory interpretation, it has rigidly applied a rule under one provision to 
a completely different provision. In order to understand why the interpretation 
of the rule in Wall should not be applied to the redesignation provisions in Si-
                                                 
 139 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d 668. See 42 U.S.C. §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) the Administrator has 
fully approved the applicable implementation plan for the area under section 7410(k) of this 
title. 
 140 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
 141 Id. at 670. 
 142 The type of language the court is referring to is the language used in Subpart 1 and 
Subpart 2 of Part D which is part of § 7407(d)(3)(E)(v). 
 143 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 670. 
 144 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandies, J. dissent-
ing). 
 145 Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect To Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1901-02 (2008). 
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erra Club, it is important to explore the two differing statutes at issue. 
In Wall, the pollutant in question was ozone pollution. 146  As mentioned 
above, ozone pollution has “additional provisions” under Subpart 2. It was the 
precise language in §7511a(b)(2) that the court found unambiguous.147 Howev-
er, Sierra Club should not have involved consideration of Subpart 2, for the 
pollutant in question was fine particle matter (PM2.5).148 The Court glazed over 
the EPA’s argument that Wall’s unambiguous language was in a different sub-
part (Subpart 2) by claiming Subpart 1 used the same “type of language” as 
Subpart 2.149 In order to test their interpretation that the two subparts have the 
same “type of language” it is critical to evaluate the text of both Subpart 1 and 
Subpart 2. Subpart 1 requires the following: 
Such plan provisions shall provide for the implementation of all reasonably avail-
able control measures as expeditiously as practicable (including such reductions in 
emissions from existing sources in the area as may be obtained through the adop-
tion, at a minimum, of reasonably available control technology) and shall provide 
for attainment of the national primary ambient air quality standards.150 
Meanwhile, Subpart 2 states: 
(2) Reasonably available control technology 
The State shall submit a revision to the applicable implementation plan to include 
provisions to require the implementation of reasonably available control technolo-
gy under section 7502(c)(1) of this title with respect to each of the following: 
(A) Each category of VOC sources in the area covered by a CTG document issued 
by the Administrator between November 15, 1990, and the date of attainment. 
(B) All VOC sources in the area covered by any CTG issued before November 15, 
1990. 
(C) All other major stationary sources of VOCs that are located in the area. 
Each revision described in subparagraph (A) shall be submitted within the period 
set forth by the Administrator in issuing the relevant CTG document. The revi-
sions with respect to sources described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) shall be 
submitted by 2 years after November 15, 1990, and shall provide for the imple-
mentation of the required measures as expeditiously as practicable but no later 
than May 31, 1995.151 
There are a number of differences between Subpart 1 and Subpart 2, which 
indicate that the two should not share the same statutory interpretation. First, 
the title of the two subpart, Subpart 1 is titled “Nonattainment Areas in Gen-
eral”152 and Subpart 2 is titled “Additional Provisions for Ozone Nonattainment 
Areas.”153 Their headings indicate that the requirements in Subpart 2 are further 
                                                 
 146 Wall, 265 F.3d at 432. 
 147 Id. at 440. 
 148 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 660. 
 149 Id. at 670. 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 
 151 Id. at § 7511a(b)(2)(A)-(C). 
 152 42 U.S.C. Ch. 85, Subch. I, Pt. D, Subpt. 1. 
 153 Id. at Subpt. 2. 
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requirements placed on ozone pollution nonattainment areas and an intent of 
Congress to further separate the requirements of ozone pollution from those of 
fine particulate matter. 
Second, the legislative history of the two subparts indicates a separate intent 
by Congress, which is another reason to interpret the two subparts differently. 
Subpart 1 was a product of the 1977 Amendments to the CAA,154 established to 
provide additional regulatory provisions in order to achieve and maintain am-
bient air quality standards for all listed pollutants.155 Additionally, the 1977 
Amendments set deadlines for attainment of the NAAQS.156 In 1989, two years 
after the established deadline to achieve ozone NAAQS, Congress discovered 
that 150 million people were living in an area that was in non-attainment.157 
Congress amended the CAA in 1990, creating Subpart 2 in order to address the 
noncompliance of ozone pollution158 by promulgating more stringent control 
requirements.159 
The 1990 addition of Subpart 2, which was geared toward ozone nonattain-
ment, is a clear indication that Congress was seeking a different standard to be 
applied to ozone than the requirements under Subpart 1. The Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Subpart 1 to be interpreted same as Subpart 2 would com-
pletely nullify the need for Subpart 2. Additionally, Congress’s goal in reach-
ing attainment for ozone would be undermined by saying that Subparts 1 and 2 
have the same congressional intent. 
If §7502(c)(1) (the provision under Subpart 1) imposes the same require-
ment as §7511a(c)(2) (the provision under Subpart 2), Congress would not 
have needed to add the provision under Subpart 2. If Congress had intended 
the requirements to be equally applied, they could have simply cross-
referenced Subpart 1 as the standard for ozone pollution nonattainment. Sub-
part 2 does in fact reference Subpart 1, but not to show that the two are synon-
ymous. Instead, it is a reference to where RACT is initially mentioned in the 
statute in order to provide clarity of the RACT requirement for specific sources 
of ozone pollutions.160 Furthermore, the EPA does not refute the fact that Sub-
part 2 is unambiguously a clear requirement for redesignation for ozone pollu-
tion; it is Subpart 1 that is applicable in Sierra Club.161 
                                                 
 154 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation Plans—
Thirty-Seven Years Of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 221 (2004). 
 155 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 32. 
 156 Id. at 7. 
 157 S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 3397 (1989). 
 158 BELDEN, supra note 2, at 35. 
 159 Id. at 8. 
 160 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2)(A)-(C). 
 161 Brief for Respondent at 60, Sierra Club v. EPA, 793 F.3d 656, 668 (2015) (No. 12-
3169, 12-3182, 12-3420). 
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The third distinction is that Subpart 2 speaks with specificity. Subpart 2 re-
quires States to “submit a revision to the applicable implementation plan” with 
provisions that include the implementation of RACT.162 The statute does not 
end with just a RACT requirement; it identifies specific sources of ozone pol-
lution and their requirement to use RACT.163 The provision ends with a hard 
deadline for implementation of May 31, 1995.164 Subpart 2 specifically men-
tions an “applicable implementation plan,” which is the exact phrase used in 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(ii).165 
Compare the specific language of Subpart 2 with the less specific language 
of Subpart 1. Subpart 1 does not begin with the strong language “the State 
shall” as Subpart 2 does.166 Rather the provision begins “plan provisions shall 
provide for the implementation” of RACM/RACT.167 Subpart 1 does not identi-
fy the plan in a way that makes it clear that it is referring to the “applicable 
implementation plan” used in §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii), as Subpart 2 does. The very 
use of the phrase “applicable implementation plan” in Subpart 2 is a strong 
indicator that Congress intended this requirement to be applied to the redesig-
nation provision that uses the same exact phrase. However, Subpart 1 simply 
says “plan revisions,” which gives no indication that this plan is the “applica-
ble” plan mentioned in §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii). 
Additionally, the deadline for implementation in Subpart 1 is less specific, 
which requires the use of RACM, which includes RACT at a minimum, but is 
a broader category of counter measures168 “as expeditiously as practicable.”169 
Subpart 2 requires the nonattainment area to have implemented RACT “as ex-
peditiously as practicable but not later than May 31, 1995.”170 The area in ques-
tion in Wall submitted their requests for redesignation in 1999, four years after 
the deadline in subpart 2 for implementation of RACT.171 The decision might 
have been made differently in Wall had the area achieved the air quality stand-
ards for ozone pollution before May 31, 1995, and then sought redesignation. 
However, the deadline for implementation of RACT/RACM in Sierra Club for 
fine particulate matter was “as expeditiously as practicable.”172 
                                                 
 162 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c)(2). 
 163 Id. at § 7511a(c)(2)(A). 
 164 Id. at § 7511a(b)(2)(C). 
 165 Id. at § 7511a(c)(2); see also id. at § 7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) (the Administrator has fully 
approved the applicable implementation plan for the area under 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1990) of 
this title). 
 166 Id. at § 7502(c)(1); id. at § 7511a(c)(2). 
 167 Id. at § 7502(c)(1). 
 168 Zacaroli, supra note 6, at 49. 
 169 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 
 170 Id. at § 7511a(b)(2)(C). 
 171 Wall, 265 F.3d at 433. 
 172 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 668 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (1990)). 
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Why does the specificity of Subpart 2 matter? It is precisely the specific na-
ture of Subpart 2 that led the Wall court to conclude that “it is clear that Con-
gress intended for SIPs submitted for redesignation requests to include ‘provi-
sions to require the implementation of’ RACT measures.”173 The court refers to 
Subpart 2 as “establish[ing] additional specific requirements,” while calling 
Subpart 1 the “basic requirements.”174 The Wall court also acknowledges that 
“[i]n some cases, the pollutant-specific requirements contained in subparts 2-5 
of part D override subpart 1’s general provisions.”175 What would be the point 
in having a provision override another provision if they are to be interpreted in 
the same manner? 
To summarize, Subpart 2’s use of the exact phrase “applicable implementa-
tion plan,” its requirement of a fixed deadline for implementation, its specific 
requirement of the implementation of RACT, and its identification of the 
sources of pollution for which RACT will apply, are all important textual dis-
tinctions between the two subparts. The Sixth Circuit, in Sierra Club, ignoring 
theses distinctions between Subpart 1 and Subpart 2, found that they had the 
same “type of language.” 176  But is “shall provide” 177  and “shall submit” 178 
enough to indicate Congress’ clear intent? The court in Wall did not find that 
language similar enough to indicate a shared unambiguity; for they found a 
provision in Subpart 2 requiring a transportation-conformity requirement in the 
SIP not to be a requirement before redesignation. 179  For Wall, what made 
§7511a(c)(2) of Subpart 2 so unambiguous was the specificity of the provision 
and its deadlines, which predated any redesignation request.180 These character-
istics are not present in §7502(c)(1) of Subpart 1, the nonattainment provisions 
for PM2.5. 
It is important to note that not only did the Sixth Circuit’s Sierra Club ex-
tend the Wall analysis incorrectly by equating Subpart 2 (§7511a(c)(2)) with 
Subpart 1 (§7502(c)(1)) in relation to the “applicable” requirements in 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(v), but with next to no analysis attached their unambiguous 
label of “applicable” to §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii).181 Once again, Wall cannot be a 
reasonable justification for this. Wall found “applicable” used in 
                                                 
 173 Wall, 265 F.3d at 440. 
 174 Id. at 431. 
 175 Id. (citing State Implementation Plans; General Preamble for Implementation of Title 
I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 57 Fed. Reg. 13501 (Apr. 16, 1992) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52)). 
 176 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 670. 
 177 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1). 
 178 Id. at § 7511a(c)(2). 
 179 Wall, 265 F.3d at 440; See 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1) (2012). 
 180 Wall, 265 F.3d at 440. 
 181 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
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§7407(d)(3)(E)(v) to be ambiguous,182 except for in its requirement of RACT 
for moderate ozone pollution (§7511a(c)(2) or Subpart 2). 183  As addressed 
above, Sierra Club was about PM2.5 and not ozone. Using the wrong statute, 
the Sixth Circuit decided §7407(d)(3)(E)(v) was unambiguous, and therefore 
decided that §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) was unambiguous as well.184 
c. The Sixth Circuit departs from other jurisdictions on RACT requirement 
The Sixth Circuit, while citing Wall, held that the CAA “unambiguously re-
quires RACT in the area’s SIP as a prerequisite to redesignation…”.185 In doing 
so, it rejects the EPA’s claim that a requirement is only “applicable” if it is 
necessary to attain the ambient air quality standard for PM2.5.186 The rejection 
of the EPA’s interpretation of RACT requirement is in direct opposition to 
three other circuit courts. 
In Sierra Club v. EPA, a case dealing with RACM requirements for ozone 
pollution, the Fifth Circuit found that “only those measures that would advance 
the attainment date” are required in the SIP.187 The Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
EPA’s interpretation that §7502(c)(1), the portion mentioned in the previous 
subsection, only imposes a requirement to implement RACM that contributes 
to attainment as being practicable.188 They not only agreed with the EPA’s in-
terpretation but they concluded that Congress intended to preserve the EPA’s 
interpretation regarding RACM with their subsequent amendments to the 
CAA.189 While the Sixth Circuit found a rigid requirement to implement con-
trol technology even if the area had achieved the NAAQS, the Fifth Circuit 
allowed the EPA discretion, taking into consideration the administrative bur-
den and high costs of implementing controls, in determining the necessary con-
trol requirements.190 The flexibility that the Fifth Circuit sees the CAA giving 
the EPA is not present in the Sixth Circuit’s opinion. 
In Ober v. Whitman, the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA had the discretion, 
under the 1990 amendments to the CAA, to make exemptions to control re-
quirements by considering the attainment deadlines. 191  The case before the 
Ninth Circuit involved de minimis sources of PM10 pollution that, whether 
                                                 
 182 Wall, 265 F.3d at 438. 
 183 Id. at 440. 
 184 Sierra Club, 793 F.3d at 669. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Sierra Club v. EPA, 314 F.3d 735, 744 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 188 Id. at 743. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 744. 
 191 Ober v. Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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controlled or not, would have no effect on attainment in the implementation 
plan.192 The court found that it would be “reasonable to decline to control the 
de minimis sources of pollution.”193 While this case is not analogous to the 
Sixth Circuit case, in that the area in question has not achieved the ambient air 
quality standards, it does illustrate the willingness of a circuit court to allow 
the EPA discretion in determining the need to implement certain control re-
quirements. Additionally, it highlights that the aim of any control requirement 
is the achievement of the NAAQS for a particular pollutant and that the EPA 
has leeway to suspend requirements that do not interfere with achieving the 
attainment goals.194 
In 2002, the D.C. Circuit Court, in Sierra Club v. EPA, reached the opposite 
conclusion that the Sixth Circuit reached pertaining to the rigid RACT/RACM 
requirement for an area in nonattainment. The D.C. case involved the nonat-
tainment of ozone pollution and the EPA’s decision that the “reasonably avail-
able” portion of RACM only applies to measures that would advance the at-
tainment date.195 The court rejected the Sierra Club’s claim that RACM was 
required, regardless of whether it would advance the date of attainment or not, 
by the text and purpose of the Clean Air Act.196 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, which 
found the intent of Congress clear in requiring control measures, the D.C. Cir-
cuit found the statute ambiguous.197 In analyzing the EPA’s claim, it found that 
“the Act, on its face, neither elaborates upon which control measures shall be 
deemed ‘reasonably available,’ nor compels a state to consider whether any 
measure is ‘reasonably available’ without regard to whether it would expedite 
attainment.”198   Furthermore, the court found that “reasonably available” was 
intended by Congress to grant discretion to the EPA in determining which con-
trol measures must be implemented to achieve the NAAQS.199 
Once again, this case is not like the Sixth Circuit case, in that the area in the 
D.C. Circuit case was not achieving the NAAQS requirements. Despite not 
meeting the NAAQS, the court still deferred to the EPA on ignoring control 
measures that would not advance the area’s achievement of the NAAQS. 
Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit requires the use of control measures even though 
the area in question had achieved the NAAQS for the pollutant in question.200 
                                                 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
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More recently, the D.C. Circuit has strengthened their view that the Clean 
Air Act is ambiguous in its requirement of reasonably available control tech-
nology/measures. In NRDC v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit found that “[w]hen con-
trol technology is necessary to advance attainment, it is ‘reasonably available’ 
under the definition and would be required under the rule.”201 In stark contrast 
to the Sixth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit determined that if an area was already 
achieving air quality standards as expeditiously as possible, and implementing 
control technologies would not speed up the ability to achieve the air quality 
standards, then no control technologies are reasonably available.202 As stated 
above regarding the other cases, this case pertains to an area that is not current-
ly meeting the air quality standards. 
To summarize, circuit courts in the progressive West, Deep South, Rust 
Belt, and Beltway all agree that if RACT/RACM do not further the attainment 
goals for a pollutant, then it is not reasonably available and the EPA has discre-
tion in deciding to forgo those requirements placed on the state. Additionally, 
they all agree that the Clean Air Act is ambiguous in terms of the requirement 
for RACT/RACM. It is puzzling that these diverse courts would defer to the 
EPA on whether or not to implement RACT/RACM that do not hasten the ad-
vancement of attainment in states not achieving the NAAQS, while the Sixth 
Circuit would find that the CAA unambiguously requires the use of RACT 
even if the state is achieving attainment. 
In the Sixth Circuit’s original opinion, before being superseded by an en 
banc opinion, the court noted in a footnote that “[i]t may be the case that we 
will defer, as our sister circuits have done, to a view that individual measures 
are not RACM/RACT if they do not meaningfully advance the date of attain-
ment, but we leave that for another day.”203 The ‘another day’ came a few 
months later when the en banc decision completely removed the footnote. 
While the above decisions did not pertain to redesignation requests, the logic 
set forth in them should easily apply. If RACT/RACM can be suspended at the 
discretion of the EPA if they do not contribute to advance the attainment date, 
how much more should they not be required when attainment has already been 
achieved? 
d. The Seventh Circuit is correct; “applicable” is ambiguous 
The Seventh Circuit ignores many of the technical quibbles between the Si-
erra Club and the EPA and boils the question down to “[i]s an “applicable” 
plan the same as the area’s pre-attainment plan (as the Sierra Club contends), 
                                                 
 201 Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 571 F.3d 1245, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Sierra Club v. EPA, 781 F.3d 299, 313 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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or is it limited to those measures that have proved to be necessary to achieve 
compliance (the EPA’s view)?”204 Unlike in the Sixth Circuit cases, there is not 
a dispute about RACT measures and the ambiguousness of part D’s subparts. 
This case has to do with the requirements for ozone nonattainment among the 
different classifications of nonattainment, moderate nonattainment and serious 
nonattainment.205 The difference between moderate and serious nonattainment 
determines the extra steps source emitters must take to reduce their emis-
sions.206 
The court determines which requirements are “applicable” under 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(ii).207 Is the “applicable implementation plan” one that includes 
all of the requirements that should have been implemented when attainment 
was achieved (serious nonattainment requirements), or is it what was being 
implemented that led to the achievement of the NAAQS? The Seventh Circuit 
Court, acknowledging Wall, found no basis for the court to make the choice 
between the two options.208 
The court, seeing no definition within the statute, found the Chevron level of 
analysis was appropriate.209 Under Chevron, courts review the agency’s inter-
pretation of a statute by asking whether the intent of Congress is clear.210 If 
Congress has not unambiguously spoken on this precise question, the courts 
will ask, is the agency’s interpretation of the statute a permissible one?211 
The Seventh Circuit, looking at the language of §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii), found 
the wording used by Congress a “curiously indirect way” of requiring more 
onerous than necessary plans.212 The court correctly notes that if Congress had 
intended a rigid requirement for redesignation, they could have written the 
statute in a more direct way.213 Furthermore, they point out that the very word 
“‘applicable’ implies that there may be differences between the contents of the 
pre-attainment plan and those required for the post-attainment period.”214 
The difficulty in establishing whether or not a statute is ambiguous is that 
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there is no clear standard;215 yet the determination that a statute is ambiguous is 
vital to whether or not the court will defer to the agency’s interpretation of the 
statute.216 Some have argued that there is a growing shift away from Chevron 
deference and an increase in limiting the EPA’s authority.217 It is important to 
explore recent court decisions in which the courts have found language used by 
Congress unambiguous. In recent years, the D.C. Circuit has found “daily,”218 
“any,”219 and “achievable”220 to be unambiguous.221 
The phrase in dispute in both the Sixth Circuit and Seventh Circuit’s Sierra 
Club is 7407(d)(3)(E)(ii)’s “applicable implementation plan.” “Applicable,” 
unlike “daily,” “any,” or “achievable” is ambiguous. Even Wall, the case used 
by the Sixth Circuit in denying Chevron deference for this statute, says that 
although “‘[a]pplicable’ could be interpreted as limiting only the geographical 
area to which the statutory requirements apply, it can also be interpreted as 
limiting the number of actual requirements…”.222 The word “applicable,” as the 
Seventh Circuit points out, is a versatile word lacking in any one definition.223 
To find an “unambiguously expressed intent” by Congress in using this word 
would defy logic. 
Perhaps, the best case to examine when deciding if a statute is ambiguous or 
not is Chevron itself. The phrase in the CAA that was under the Supreme 
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Court’s review was “stationary source.”224 The respondent in Chevron tried to 
argue that because “stationary source” was defined in another part of the CAA, 
the Court should adopt that definition for the portion of the statute under re-
view.225 However, the Court found that the “parsing of general terms in the text 
of a statute” does not reveal the clear intent of Congress.226 Additionally, they 
note that “the terms are overlapping and the language is not precisely directed 
to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context of a larger 
operation.”227 This argument is echoed in the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of 
“applicable” lacking any clear, singular meaning.228 
e. Applying Chevron 
As mentioned previously, Chevron requires the court to address two ques-
tions: did Congress speak unambiguously on that precise question, and if not, 
is the agency’s interpretation of the statute a permissible one?229 For the rea-
sons mentioned in the previous sections, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit incor-
rectly found an unambiguous congressional intent in a statute which has no 
clearly defined meaning. 
Since §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii), the statute in question in both circuits’ Sierra Club 
v. EPA, is ambiguous, the second question in the Chevron analysis needs to be 
addressed: is the agency’s interpretation based on a permissible construction of 
the statute?230 The EPA’s interpretation of §7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) is that “applicable 
implementation plan” is the components of the SIP that where needed to 
achieve the attainment of the NAAQS.231 Is this a permissible construction? 
The CAA states “[a] primary goal of this chapter is to encourage or other-
wise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions, con-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter, for pollution prevention.”232 The 
EPA’s interpretation promotes this reasonable cooperation between the federal 
and state governments. If the states were required to implement more costly 
measures even after meeting NAAQS requirements, this would hardly give 
them an incentive to come within compliance.233 As the Seventh Circuit opined, 
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“the residents and businesses of St. Louis must take the same costly steps that 
would be required had the area been less successful.”234 In a Senate Report 
written before the passage of the 1990 amendments, the Senate noted that 
“[b]ecause States have limited resources and many additional responsibilities, 
both the State and Federal Government should work together to ensure  the 
implementation of programs that improve air quality.”235 This illustrates the 
intent that the CAA be a collaborative effort between state and federal gov-
ernments, as well as Congress’ respect for the limited resources the states have 
in tackling air pollution. To punitively require a state to implement more strin-
gent controls even after they have met the air quality standards is at odds with 
this statement by the Senate. 
At the core of the CAA is a “federalism-focused” regulatory scheme, with 
the primary responsibility of achieving control of air pollution resting with the 
states and local governments.236 The regulatory structure established under the 
CAA was based on attaining air quality standards using SIPs to meet these 
standards.237 For states that do not meet these standards, their SIPs must im-
plement all reasonably available control measures, which include RACT as 
expeditiously as practicable.238 What happens when the state meets the NAAQS 
requirements before RACT is implemented? It is a permissible construction 
given the goals of the CAA to interpret “applicable implementation plan” to 
mean the components of the plan responsible for bringing the area in compli-
ance with the NAAQS. This satisfies the second prong of the Chevron analy-
sis. 
CONCLUSION 
The CAA has a long history of revisions and amendments, which makes it 
“extremely complex and multifaceted.”239 The states and federal government’s 
implementation of this complex Act has resulted in extensive review by the 
federal courts.240 Therefore, it is not surprising that two circuit courts would 
differ on the meaning of a particular portion of the Act. 
The Sixth Circuit’s finding that the express language of Congress is clear 
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pertaining to the “applicable implementation plan”241 cannot be supported by a 
plain reading of the statute. The court offers no rationale for why 
§7407(d)(3)(E)(ii) is unambiguous, other than to cite an unambiguously writ-
ten provision242 that is not under review in the case that is before it. They mis-
interpret Wall in closing the door on giving deference to the EPA in determin-
ing which “applicable” requirements are necessary for redesignation.243 They 
do this despite Wall’s decision that “applicable” is ambiguous when deciding 
the requirements for redesignation.244 Additionally, in determining that RACT 
is a requirement necessary for attainment, is in direct contrast to the Fifth, Sev-
enth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. 
The Seventh Circuit properly concluded that the “applicable implementation 
plan” is ambiguous.245 They found both the Sierra Club (“applicable” meaning 
what the SIP should have implemented at the time of attainment) and the EPA 
(“applicable” meaning the requirements that led to compliance) have “conceiv-
able understandings of the law.”246 The EPA’s definition, which received the 
Chevron deference, is permissible because it is in keeping with the goals of the 
CAA to create a reasonable cooperation among the federal and state govern-
ments in achieving air quality. 
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